Identify Mirai Variant Infected Devices from SSDP Response
As it has been discussed in some reports from security researchers, devices infected with Mirai and its variants are forming large-scale botnets, which are often leveraged as a platform for attacks such as DDoS and other malicious activities.
JPCERT/CC has been conducting investigation and analysis of infection activities caused by Mirai variants from 2016 and providing measures to prevent further infection both in Japan and overseas. At the end of October 2017, given the significant increase in the devices infected with Mirai and its variant, JPCERT/CC issued a security alert on 19 December. For the release of this alert, JPCERT/CC coordinated with a device vendor in identifying the infected device models. This entry introduces the approaches that we took for this investigation.
Observation results and initial investigation
In late October 2017, we confirmed through JPCERT/CC’s packet traffic monitoring system (TSUBAME) that devices infected with a Mirai variant were carrying out scans to global IP addresses, targeting Port 23/TCP and 2323/TCP. Further detailed analysis revealed some of the source IP addresses used for the scan activities. 
Comparing the IP addresses against the network scan results provided by local/global security organisations, it turned out that most of the affected hosts were accessible directly from the Internet through Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP).
How to Identify MAC address from SSDP response
SSDP is one of the protocols used for Universal Plug and Play (UPnP), which enables searching for devices connected to the network, and Port 1900/UDP is assigned. Communication performed when searching for devices with SSDP is described in Figure 1.
In this protocol, a client sends a query (M-SEARCH) to the network, and devices received this query returns a response (NOTIFY).
The NOTIFY response contains information about the device itself, including Universally Unique Identifier (UUID). This is a string to uniquely identify an object on the software. There are 5 versions for UUID , and the version 1 is based on the timestamp (when the UUID was generated) and the MAC address of the device. Figure 2 explains the data structure of the UUID version 1.
In this version, the device’s MAC address is inserted in the UUID’s last 12 digits. This means that the device itself can be identified by looking at the NOTIFY payload in response to a SSDP query. The device vendor can also be determined from the vendor ID, which lies in the first 3 octets of the MAC address.
Identify infected devices and take measures
Most of the devices that were found infected with a Mirai variant had been used with SSDP service publicly available on the Internet, and its UUID was version 1. This made us possible to identify the MAC address and consequently the vendor of the affected devices. From the MAC addresses and packet traffic observed through TSUBAME, JPCERT/CC coordinated with the vendor in question and identified the affected device models, which led to the release of the security alert together with some related organisations to raise users’ awareness.
JPCERT/CC continues to coordinate with vendors in investigation on devices and request for security measures, so that the any further infection can be prevented.
We introduced how we came to identify infected devices. If SSDP port is left publicly accessible on the Internet, it has potential risks to be used for DDoS attacks  and other malicious activities leveraging UPnP vulnerability  . If you are using UPnP-equipped devices, please make sure that the security measures are properly taken such as 1) keep the firmware up-to-date, 2) not expose UPnP service on the Internet and 3) disable UPnP function if not being used.
If you have any questions, please contact global-cc[at]jpcert.or.jp.
Thanks for reading.
- Tomoaki Tani
(Translated by Yukako Uchida)
 JPCERT/CC Internet Threat Monitoring Report [October 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017] [JPCERT/CC]
 RFC 4122: A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace
 Alert (TA14-017A) UDP-Based Amplification Attacks [US-CERT]
 US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#357851
UPnP requests accepted over router WAN interfaces
 CVE-2014-8361 Detail [NIST]