JPCERT/CC has observed attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges believed to be related to DangerousPassword attack campaign (also known as CryptoMimic or SnatchCrypto) continuously since June 2019. For many years, attackers have been using an attack technique of infecting targets with malware by sending shortcut files to them via email. However, it is known that they also use various other patterns of attacks to infect the targets with malware. This article will...
List of “朝長 秀誠 (Shusei Tomonaga)”
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I believe that automating analysis is a challenge that all malware analysts are working on for more efficient daily incident investigations. Cloud-based technologies (CI/CD, serverless, IaC, etc.) are great solutions that can automate MAOps efficiently. In this article, I introduce how JPCERT/CC automates malware analysis on the cloud, based on the following case studies. Malware C2 Monitoring Malware Hunting using Cloud YARA CI/CD system Surface Analysis System on Cloud Memory...
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JPCERT/CC released the latest version (v1.6) of LogonTracer, a tool to support event log analysis. Previously, LogonTracer could not investigate multiple incidents simultaneously, but this update adds support for managing multiple logs. In addition, Sigma can now be used to investigate the presence of suspicious logs in the event log. This article introduces these updates. For other updated items, please refer to the following release: https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer/releases/tag/v1.6.0 Log Management Feature When...
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Around May 2022, JPCERT/CC confirmed an attack activity against Japanese organizations that exploited F5 BIG-IP vulnerability (CVE-2022-1388). The targeted organizations have confirmed that data in BIG-IP has been compromised. We consider that this attack is related to the activities by BlackTech attack group. This blog article describes the attack activities that exploit this BIG-IP vulnerability. Attack code that exploits the BIG-IP vulnerability Below is a part of the attack code...
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JPCERT/CC is continuously investigating the activities by Lazarus. In ...
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Some types of malware use DGA, obfuscate destination information, or c...
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To conceal malware’s features, attackers sometimes encode the malware and decode it only when they execute it. In such cases, the encoded malware is loaded and executed by a program called loader. In this way, an attacker can split the malware into a loader and encoded malware. Minimizing the loader’s features and hiding important features of the malware make detection on infected hosts more difficult. Among such loaders, this article...
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Malware targeting Windows OS (PE format) has a variety of obfuscation and packing techniques in place so that they complicate the code analysis processes. On the other hand, there are only a few types of packing techniques for Linux-targeting malware (ELF format), and it is mainly UPX-based. This blog article explains the details of Anti-UPX Unpacking technique, which is often applied to Linux-targeting malware. Malware with Anti-UPX Unpacking Technique The...
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An attack group BlackTech has been actively conducting attacks against Japanese organisations since 2018. Although it is not as prominent as before, JPCERT/CC is still seeing some cases as of now. This article introduces the details of the malware Gh0stTimes, which is used by this group. Gh0stTimes overview Gh0stTimes is customised based on Gh0st RAT and has been used in some attack cases since 2020. Figure 1 shows the comparison...
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Volatility 3 had long been a beta version, but finally its v.1.0.0 was released in February 2021. Since Volatility 2 is no longer supported [1], analysts who used Volatility 2 for memory image forensics should be using Volatility 3 already. In this blog post, I introduce a tip for Volatility 3: how to use Volatility 3 offline. This instruction focuses on analyzing Windows OS memory image. What is the problem...
