Multiple Threat Actors Rapidly Exploit React2Shell: A Case Study of Active Compromise

On December 3, 2025 (local time), a vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote code execution in React Server Components (RSC) (CVE-2025-55182) was disclosed. JPCERT/CC has received multiple incident reports related to this attack. Among them, there was a case in which this vulnerability was exploited by multiple threat actors within a short period of time, resulting in multiple incidents occurring simultaneously, including website defacement. This article demonstrates how rapidly and indiscriminately attackers act when an easily exploitable vulnerability is disclosed, together with an attack timeline and an overview of the malware used. We hope this will serve as a reference for understanding how quickly countermeasures must be implemented when such critical vulnerabilities are made public.

Attack Timeline

Table 1 shows the attack timeline identified in the case. (To avoid revealing the identity of the affected organization, some URL paths and identifiers are masked.)

Table 1: Attack Timeline
Date and Time (JST)
Description
2025-12-05 15:52 Installation of coin miners (sex.sh, xmrig)
2025-12-06 07:28 Installation of coin miner (sex.sh.1)
2025-12-06 09:53, 10:09, 11:00 Installation of HISONIC (javax) backdoor
2025-12-06 15:00 Execution of Global Socket (npm-cli) hourly via cron
2025-12-06 19:31 Installation of SNOWLIGHT downloader (javas) and CrossC2 (rsyslo)
2025-12-07 12:24 Installation of coin miner (xmrig)
2025-12-07 16:51 Cron configuration modified to execute /tmp/kernal (disguised as kernel) every minute
2025-12-07 19:46 Website defacement (display of warning message)
2025-12-07 22:15 Incident discovered following a report from a service user

Only two days after the React2Shell vulnerability was disclosed on December 3, 2025, attacks aimed at installing coin miners were observed. Following this initial activity, various types of malware such as RATs and backdoors were installed and executed by multiple attackers, resulting in a situation where multiple threat actors had compromised a single server.
In addition to the timeline above, suspicious HTTP POST communications believed to target the React2Shell vulnerability were observed in the web server access logs from more than 100 IP addresses during the period from December 5 to 7, 2025. (Because request headers and POST data were not recorded in the access logs, this assessment was based on factors such as the User-Agent, request path, and response size.) This suggests that the server may actually have been targeted by even more attackers.

Initial Website Defacement

In this case, the compromise was discovered after a website user noticed that the website had been defaced by attackers and reported it. On the defaced website, a warning message was displayed in four languages stating that there was a vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-55182 and that patches needed to be applied immediately. Figure 1 shows an example of a defaced web page.

Figure 1: Defaced web page

Such defacements were confirmed on multiple websites both in Japan and overseas, all of which contained text urging immediate countermeasures to the vulnerability. Figure 2 shows an example of defaced sites displayed in search engine results.

Figure 2: Google search results

Installed Malware

In this case, a variety of malware and open-source tools were abused. Table 2 lists the malware that was installed (excluding configuration files and similar artifacts).

Table 2: Installed Malware
No.
File Name
Description
1 sex.sh Bash script for downloading xmrig
2 sex.sh.1 Bash script for downloading xmrig
3 miner.sh Bash script for launching xmrig
4 xmrig xmrig coin miner
5 javax HISONIC backdoor
6 javas Bash script for downloading SNOWLIGHT
7 rsyslo CrossC2 RAT
8 npm-cli Global Socket tool
9 kernal Details unknown because it had been deleted

Notably, in addition to typical financially motivated coin miners, the following were also observed: a SNOWLIGHT [1] downloader reportedly used by UNC5174, a Golang-based HISONIC backdoor [2] reportedly used by UNC6603, and CrossC2 RAT [3], the Linux version of the Cobalt Strike implementation, which was installed at the same time as SNOWLIGHT. Although the attackers’ actual objectives remain unclear, it is possible that these tools were intended to be exploited as part of a future attack infrastructure.
Additionally, unlike most cases reported by other security vendors, this incident involved the abuse of the open-source tool Global Socket (gsocket) [4]. This tool enables two devices that cannot directly reach each other due to NAT or firewall restrictions to connect via a relay network called the Global Socket Relay Network (GSRN). A key feature is that only devices sharing the same pre-shared key can communicate with each other. Communications are end-to-end encrypted, and GSRN only relays encrypted traffic.
In this case, the attackers specified the following environment variables and options at execution time, using npm-cli.dat as a secret file and abusing the tool as a backdoor that allowed remote operation via bash over port 53, which is primarily used for DNS communication.

GS_PORT='53' SHELL=/bin/bash TERM=xterm-256color GS_ARGS="-k /home/***/.config/dbus/npm-cli.dat -liqD"

Conclusion

In this React2Shell case, the vulnerability was rapidly incorporated into attack tools after disclosure, and within just a few days it was observed being abused by many threat actors. Attackers exploit vulnerabilities at extremely high speed, and when critical vulnerabilities are disclosed, it is essential to promptly assess the scope of impact and apply patches and other countermeasures.
Furthermore, when addressing vulnerabilities that are known to be actively exploited, it is necessary to verify whether compromise has already occurred in addition to applying patches. As demonstrated in this case, there may be more serious compromises beyond visible website defacement, and so it is recommended to carefully investigate whether there are any other affected components.
Details such as the C2 of the malware covered in this article are provided in the Appendix for reference.

Kota Kino, Yuki Yano (This article was machine-translated and manually reviewed.)

References

[1] SNOWLIGHT Windows malware used by UNC5174
https://sect.iij.ad.jp/blog/2025/11/unc5174-windows-snowlight-in-2025/

[2] Multiple Threat Actors Exploit React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182)
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actors-exploit-react2shell-cve-2025-55182

[3] CrossC2 Expanding Cobalt Strike Beacon to Cross-Platform Attacks
https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2025/08/crossc2.html

[4] Global Socket
https://github.com/hackerschoice/gsocket

Appendix A: C2

No.
Destination
Purpose
1 45.143.131[.]123:59999 SNOWLIGHT download source / C2 server
2 154.89.152[.]240:443 CrossC2 C2 server

Appendix B: Malware Hashes

No.
Hash (SHA-256)
File Name
1 5bae25736a09de5f4a0f9761d2b7bfa81ca8dba39de2a724473c9d021a65daa9 sex.sh
2 ba43e447e63611d365300bf2e8e43ccb02ea112778d0d555ef9a9ccf6169808b sex.sh
3 ac3e12fa0aa4d6e4eed322e81ecf708a8c9bea29247ae6b26cc39d3b3a6c2fb8 miner.sh
4 a536d755313ce550a510137211eca6171f636fb316026e9df8523c496c8fcd12 xmrig
5 0c748b9e8bc6b5b4fe989df67655f3301d28ef81617b9cbe8e0f6a19d4f9b657 xmrig
6 1a1edbea47162b1aa844252fcd4fb97f2a67faec1993e7819efc6a04b7c15552 javax
7 0d07a974993221305ca7af139b73d9de1dcd992f553215e4f041e830a2d82729 javas
8 5baa52387daedea5e3e00adf96ecacb4a2cdc98100664f29ac86e8e4a423baaf 54ad0ee3tcp
9 c1a9cfc62626118bd9f54e401fd52ecd2d766a5e8a69dbc7db909ea5c987fcc0 54ad0ee3tcp
10 4a74676bd00250d9b905b95c75c067369e3911cdf3141f947de517f58fc9f85c rsyslo
11 cb5f62bf7b591e69bd38e6bf8e40e8d307d154b2935703422d44f02e403d2e78 npm-cli
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